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Introduction 
It has long been argued that materialist explanations (i.e. focussing exclusively on interests) of 
policy-making and institutional change are limited and that concepts developed within the ‘new’ 
institutionalism may provide some extra explanatory depth (Blyth 2002; Fischer 2003; Widmaier 
et al 2007). The ‘new’ institutionalism, formed in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to rational 
choice and behaviouralism, sought to ‘bring the state back in’ to the explanation of political 
action (Peters 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996). Sociological and constructivist variants of new 
institutionalism have built upon Peter Hall’s (1993) seminal work on policy paradigms  in order 
to provide explanations of the role ideas play in policy and institutional change. These analyses 
proceed from the observation that frameworks of ideas colour not only how a policy problem is 
understood, but also policy choices and institutional structures (e.g. Niemelä and Saarinen 2012). 
Likewise, frameworks of ideas can also impact heavily upon processes of institutional change, 
often understood as happening during periods of crisis. Ideas and their expression in the form of 
narratives are understood as being capable of convincing groups within society that there is a 
crisis, that existing policy is failing to solve the crisis, and that alternative solutions should be 
pursued. 
 These recent analyses are particularly adept at explaining change, but potentially at the 
cost of conceptualising what exactly constitutes a policy paradigm shift or how we can measure 
whether or not one has taken place. The most precise measurements of what a paradigm shift 
would look like can be found in articles by Hall (1993) and Oliver and Pemberton (2004). Hall 
suggests that a policy paradigm shift has taken place only once the objectives and instruments of 
policy have been replaced by new ones, and Oliver and Pemberton add that these new 
institutions need then to become embedded for a true shift to have occurred.  
Final manuscript (NOT anonymised)
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 2 
The aim of this article is to build a framework for analysing paradigm change by drawing 
on this work whilst adding insights into explaining how and why change takes place from more 
constructivist variants of institutionalism. It thereby contributes to conceptualisations of crisis 
and change within sociological and constructivist new institutionalism. Empirically, the paper 
also contributes to recent debates about whether or not a paradigm shift has occurred in energy 
policy.  
The paper proceeds across four sections. The next section develops the analytical 
framework and the second section applies the framework to UK energy policy developments 
from 2000 to 2011 to test its analytical purchase.
1
 Energy policy in the UK is an important field 
to study policy paradigms for two reasons. First, policy paradigms are particularly influential in 
areas that are considered to be highly technical and require a body of specialist knowledge, such 
as energy policy (Hall 1993: 291). Furthermore, identifying significant changes to the UK energy 
policy paradigm is significant given that it has long been held up as a ‘model’ for other countries 
(IEA 2007). Second, there is a current debate about whether or not a policy paradigm shift is 
taking place within energy policy in the UK (see Mitchell 2008; Routledge 2010; Kuzemko 
2013), and beyond (Helm 2005; Goldthau 2012). Within this debate it is also often noted that the 
evolving governance system is both highly complex and difficult to understand, not least in 
terms of what it might achieve (Keay 2012; cf. Rutledge 2010). The research draws on a 
systematic analysis of policy documents, including White Papers and strategy documents, and 
secondary literature. This data is complemented by twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with 
key stakeholders involved in UK energy policy-making over the last decade.
2
  
                                                 
1
 The analysis starts with the year 2000 and not in 1997, the year that New Labour came to power since The Utilities 
Act of 2000 marked the first legal change in energy policies. 
2
 For a full list of those interviewed please see Appendix. 
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 3 
The third section argues that the suggested framework proved useful for analysing 
whether or not a policy paradigm change has occurred but also identifies a limitation of the 
framework: it has little to say about the impacts and outcomes of institutional changes. The paper 
concludes by suggesting that the policy paradigm literature should pay more attention to the 
outcomes of policy change, for example to the impacts of institutional changes on how the 
energy system operates.  
 
 
 
 
Conceptualising Policy Paradigms and Change 
Hall’s (1993) original work on policy paradigms offers the starting point for analysis. He 
identifies a policy paradigm as a framework of ideas which influences the way in which policy is 
formulated in a given policy area. The framework of ideas influences the ways in which 
problems are perceived, and colours decisions about appropriate policy goals and which 
instruments are considered to be most acceptable in attaining these goals (Hall 1993: 278-9). As 
such Hall claims that policy-making can be understood as a process that involves an active and 
ongoing inter-relationship between the interpretive framework of ideas and levels of policy in the 
form of goals and instruments (1993: 278).  
Hall refers to policy paradigms as sometimes ‘taken for granted’ or ‘unamenable’ to scrutiny 
(1993: 279) and other new institutionalists have built upon these observations when analysing 
ways in which interpretive frameworks can be embedded within institutions. Governance 
institutions, such as Departments, reflect and embody the interpretive framework as well as limit 
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 4 
the impact of alternative frameworks on policy (Hay and Wincott 1998; Yee 1996; Schmidt and 
Radælli 2004). As such the ways in which formal institutions are set up and maintained and the 
mandates to which they work can be understood as important aspects of how the interpretive 
framework influences policy objectives and instruments (Kuzemko 2013: 48-9).  
To take better account of these ways in which ideas become embedded, policy paradigms are 
conceptualized here to include governance institutions, in addition to Hall’s three levels outlined 
above. Thus a policy paradigm consists of four inter-related levels: 1) ideas about the subject and 
how it should be governed (interpretive framework), 2) policy goals, 3) policy instruments and 4) 
governance institutions. If significant changes can be identified which depart from existing 
practices on each level of the policy paradigm between two time periods, i.e. in this instance 
2000 with 2011, then a policy paradigm shift can be claimed. This measurement would contrast 
with instances in which problems arise but small, ad hoc adjustments are made to only one or 
two levels (Hall 1993; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  
 Hall’s original definition of policy paradigm change suggested that it could take place 
through the method of social learning, but it had less to say about conditions under which 
institutional change takes place. Recent research within sociological variants of new 
institutionalism has concentrated on explaining processes of change, some of which emphasises 
the evolutionary aspects of profound change (Marsh 1999; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Others, 
however, have suggested profound change as a more discontinuous event and have emphasised 
the role of crisis in punctuating policy evolution (Blyth 2002; Hay 2001; Widmaier et al 2007). It 
is at such times that it can be more convincingly argued that the existing policy paradigm is not 
providing acceptable outcomes, thereby allowing its credibility to be challenged and an 
alternative policy paradigm to be accepted and institutionalised (Hay 1996; Blyth 2002; Oliver 
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 5 
and Pemberton 2004). Crises have been interpreted, therefore, as moments of breakdown but also 
of possible political agency in the form of profound policy change (Hay 1996), or at least as 
creating conditions which enhance the possibility of challenge (Wilson 2001: 262).
 
  
Crises are, however, understood not as self-apparent phenomena but events that need to be 
narrated and explained as constituting a problem in order for attention to be focused on the 
policy area in question (Blyth 2002; Widmaier et al 2007). This is where one of the roles of 
narratives within the process of change can be highlighted as a successful crisis narrative will be 
able to establish the shared perception that a crisis exists across a range of actors. In addition to 
establishing material events as ‘a crisis’, the dominant crisis narrative must also offer important, 
credible explanations as to why events constitute a crisis as well as directly related solutions 
(Blyth 2002; Hay 2001; Stone 1989). This function is highly significant in that for paradigms to 
be superseded they must not only be perceived to be obsolescent but there must also be a 
credible, alternative interpretive framework and related policies to replace it (Hay 2001; Oliver 
and Pemberton 2004).  
All this suggests, however, a quite linear process: events occur, they are widely perceived as 
constituting ‘a crisis’, existing policy is understood as incapable of addressing these problems, 
and a new policy paradigm replaces the old. This also suggests that one narrative must dominate 
the process both of establishing crisis and the new policy paradigm. Oliver and Pemberton, 
however, suggest a messier and less linear process of change that emphasises the battle between 
a range of different, competing crisis narratives (Oliver and Pemberton 2004). Albeit they also 
imply that, ultimately, the new policy paradigm will be established based on the arguments, ideas 
and solutions embodied within one alternative crisis narrative. 
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These sociological analyses of institutional change have had a great deal, therefore, to say 
about conditions under which change occurs and about the central role of crisis narratives in 
enabling change. Sociological analyses have, however, offered little precise definition of what 
needs to have occurred in order that a policy paradigm shift can be claimed. There are references 
to ‘rejection’ and ‘replacement’ of the old paradigm, but little direct measurement to show what 
has changed. By constructing a framework of analysis that both measures and explains change 
this paper hopes to provide a more rigorous assessment of the process of change. 
 
Measuring and Explaining Change: UK Energy Policy 2000-2011 
This first empirical section delineates the UK ‘pro-market’ energy policy paradigm (PEPP) in the 
year 2000 by providing a detailed description of each of the 4 levels (cf. Kuzemko 2013). This is 
in line with other characterisations of UK energy policy at this point in time (Mitchell 2008; 
Rutledge 2007; Scrase et al 2009). It then goes on to highlight the principal alternative narrative, 
climate change, which presented a challenge to the PEPP and the ways in which the paradigm 
both acknowledged but also managed to compromise these arguments. The second subsection 
introduces a further challenge to the dominant paradigm in the form of a geopolitically informed 
narrative of security of supply crisis. The last subsection analyses the ways in which climate 
change and geopolitical narratives came together to allow actors to demonstrate the failure of 
existing policies and offer solutions, ultimately leading to a policy paradigm change as measured 
by the framework applied here. 
The Pro-market Energy Policy Paradigm and the Climate Challenge: 2000-2003 
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In terms of the first level of the PEPP, the interpretative framework guiding policy making, 
energy was understood as a ‘normal’ tradable commodity and the market was seen as the most 
efficient vehicle for energy supply (Lawson 1989: 23). The role of the state was simply to create 
and maintain a level playing field open to competitive forces by establishing and enforcing fair 
market rules. Decisions about investment, fuel sources and fuel mix were left to market players. 
This interpretive framework fitted well within the overall approach of less state involvement in 
the economy that had dominated elite UK circles since the 1980s (Rutledge 2007). 
 In terms of the goals of energy policy the PEPP’s principal aim was to establish and 
maintain a competitive, freely trading energy market, and this would ensure other important 
outcomes such as energy security and affordability (Rutledge 2007; Kuzemko 2012). This is not 
to say that security and affordability objectives did not exist, just that they were understood to be 
natural outcomes of freely trading, competitive markets (DTI 2000: 7). There were ambitions 
that 10% of electricity should be supplied by renewable sources by 2010 but these had not been 
formalised as objectives of policy (Mitchell and Connor 2004: 1937).  
 Under the PEPP the principal instruments of achieving this objective had been centred 
initially around the long process of privatising and deregulating the sector, and later around the 
construction of a new regulatory framework which would effectively “steer towards a defined 
general direction... [but] leave it to the market to select the means to reach that end” (Mitchell 
2008: 1). Electricity prices were regulated via the RPI-X formula whereby electricity companies 
could make the greatest profits through cost cutting, and utilising existing assets, with little 
incentive to reinvest. 
 Lastly, in terms of the fourth level, governance institutions, energy policy was relegated to a 
subdivision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) after the Department of Energy was 
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 8 
disbanded in 1992. The DTI should maintain the regulatory framework but responsibility for 
implementation rested with the independent regulator, Ofgem (Office of the Gas and Electricity 
Markets). Formal mandates for both these organisations were centred on maintaining competitive 
markets and ensuring fair treatment for consumers (Ofgem 2006: 107).   
 As a result private energy companies, in particular the big six electricity suppliers, became 
central to the supply of energy. This inferred a particular set of power relations between the non-
interfering state and the private sector in energy whereby dominant market players had a high 
degree of influence in policymaking circles. Energy companies were incentivised, furthermore, 
to be cost efficient, to utilise assets, such as oil and gas from the North Sea, at a high rate, but not 
to think about or act in terms of the sustainability of the UK’s national energy system. 
 
[table 1: The Pro-Market Energy Policy Paradigm in 2000 here] 
 
However, from the late 1990s onwards the PEPP was being challenged by a coalition of actors 
who argued not only that a long-term, global climate change crisis existed but that Government 
needed to take a more hands on approach in energy policymaking in order to avert this crisis. 
They offered a range of solutions and specific ways in which government could become more 
involved in establishing an environmentally sustainable energy system (RCEP 2001; Greenpeace 
2006; Scrase and MacKerron 2009).  For example, in 2002 a full Energy Review was carried out, 
by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), which represented a direct challenge to the 
PEPP.  This was not least in that it suggested that there should be new and specific climate 
change and renewable energy objectives for energy policy. It also pointed out that a system of 
‘trade-offs’ should be established whereby carbon reduction objectives would trump others: 
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 9 
“…(e)nergy policy trade-offs affecting the period to 2012 should generally give priority to 
carbon reduction if there is a material risk of failing to meet internationally-agreed emissions 
targets” (PIU 2002: 52).  
 However, these challenges resulted in limited changes to the four levels of the PEPP.  The 
trade-offs recommended in the PIU were by-passed in the new 2003 Energy White Paper.  In 
addition, although for the first time energy policy was set towards achieving a formal climate 
change goal it was phrased in a rather non-specific way: “…to put ourselves on a path to cut the 
UK’s carbon dioxide emissions… by some 60% from current levels by about 2050” (DTI 2003: 
11).
3
 As such this new objective appeared vague, more like an ‘aim’ than a firm commitment, 
and was not taken as fixed within the energy division of the DTI and Ofgem (Interviews 5 and 
15). In terms of governance institutions, while the Energy Review had proposed a new 
government department responsible for climate and energy policy-making functions (PIU 2002: 
144), the White Paper overtly rejected changes in government institutions in that they wanted “to 
concentrate…energies on following through the commitments we have made, not on creating 
new machinery” (DTI 2003: 112). The interpretive framework showed the least amount of 
change in that policy makers continued to believe in the ability of competitive, liberalised 
markets to meet policy objectives, including reducing carbon emissions, energy affordability and 
energy security (cf. Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 4; DTI 2003: 11 and 15). The 2003 White Paper also 
included an overtly benign interpretation of the international context for energy, despite 
acknowledging the UK’s imminent reversal from net exporter to importer of oil and gas as well 
as the sharply growing demand from India and China.  
There was some change in policy instruments but nothing that represented a particular 
shift in the overall pro-market orientation. For example, a new Renewable Obligation (RO) was 
                                                 
3
 Italics authors’ own. 
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 10 
introduced in 2001 that placed an obligation on electricity suppliers to source a certain 
percentage of their electricity from renewable energy (Mitchell and Connor 2004). It was 
explicitly designed so that the government only specifies the target, but the obligation certificates 
are tradable and companies choose the cheapest technologies to achieve the target. The RO was 
therefore well aligned with the pro-market paradigm.  
 As such, although actors had mounted a significant challenge based on climate narratives 
arguing not only that a sustainable energy crisis existed but also that the PEPP needed to alter to 
address this problem, little change ensued to any of the four levels.  As such the PEPP showed 
quite high degrees of path dependency whilst also appearing to respond to mounting challenges 
from climate change narratives.  As will be seen below these arguments did, however, persist and 
ad hoc changes to the paradigm had already started to undermine the intellectual coherence of 
the PEPP. 
 
The Security of Supply Crisis: 2004-2007 
Various events had already started to focus some attention on energy security, such as the 
Truckers Strike of 2000 in Britain and the many major network failures around the turn of the 
Millennium, for example in New Zealand, Italy and the US. In direct contrast to benign 
perceptions of the international energy context referenced in the 2003 White Paper, a new 
challenge for the PEPP emerged around the mid-2000s when a geopolitically informed narrative 
about security of energy supply gained prominence.   
By the end of 2006 political perceptions about energy supplies in the UK and across 
Europe started to shift significantly in the wake of growing state involvement in the Russian 
energy sector, the Russo-Ukrainian gas transit dispute and rising energy prices (Barton et al 
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2004; Light 2006). Fears about Russia’s ability to affect energy trade and prices fuelled a great 
degree of political interest and fears about being dependent on unstable foreign suppliers 
mounted (EC 2006; Fox 2006; House of Commons 2007a). Newspapers were replete with 
terminology evocative of the Western Cold War mentality suggesting that Russia was fast 
becoming an ‘energy superpower’ and reminding importer nations of their hydrocarbon 
‘dependency’ status (see for example Robinson 2006; Ostrovsky 2006). Such interests were 
reflected in academia and a new ‘Journal of Energy Security’ was established in 2008.4   
The timing could not have been worse given the UK’s shifting import-export position 
(Blair in DTI 2006a). The ensuing crisis debate was similar in tone and scale to UK oil crises 
debates of the 1970s and marked the start of a significant re-politicisation of energy (DTI 2007; 
House of Commons 2006). This paper argues that it was the nature of this narrative, and the 
publically perceived threat to UK national energy security, that resulted in renewed political 
interest in and deliberation of energy and the problems it faced. 
All this represented the “highly politicised and public debate” that is claimed to 
accompany paradigm shifts (Hay 2001: 200). It appears as if the emergence of this narrative 
claiming a near-term threat to UK energy security evoked a higher degree of political interest 
than the climate narrative of long-term, global crisis. Energy governance was increasingly 
understood to merit more direct Government deliberation and this resulted in a range of new 
policy documents (see in particular DTI 2006a, 2006b; 2006c and 2007; JESS 2006).  In 2006 
another Energy Review was conducted which now referred to energy security as being one of 
two ‘immense’ challenges facing energy policy, and in the same year Tony Blair used his annual 
Lord Mayor’s speech to highlight energy security concerns (DTI 2006a: 4). Interviewees within 
                                                 
4
 See: http://www.ensec.org/. 
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Ofgem and DECC have suggested that direct political pressure was being brought to bear at this 
time to ‘do something’ about energy security (cf. Interview 15). 
 In terms of discernible change in the four levels of the UK energy policy paradigm, what 
stands out most at this stage is the genuine shift in goals. While creating competitive markets had 
been the primary goal of energy policy up until this point, ensuring energy security started to 
supersede this objective (DTI 2006a: 4). Policy instruments were also showing signs of change, 
particularly in that more decisions about energy mix were being made – albeit somewhat 
covertly. There was a significant refocus on facilitating production of domestic supplies of 
energy, including nuclear, coal and oil and gas, to avoid imports and maintain a level of energy 
independence (DTI 2006a; House of Commons 2007a).  
An interesting juxtaposition emerges here. Although geopolitically informed narratives 
had come to dominate energy debates, and had resulted in greater political attention to energy, 
understandings of supply security were not openly understood to challenge ideas about markets 
and competition.  Blame for supply insecurity was placed instead on the unstable foreign 
supplies, not on the structures of the PEPP. Therefore, at this stage an important element of the 
process of policy paradigm shift identified above, a challenge of the interpretive framework 
through mounting evidence of policy failure, was missing. There were only very limited changes 
in governance institutions. Some procedures were put in place that committed DTI and Ofgem to 
regular reports to Parliament on energy security (HM Government 2004) and the 2007 White 
Paper announced for the first time “an integrated international energy strategy which describes 
the action we are taking to help deliver secure energy supplies and tackle climate change” (DTI 
2007: 8).   
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During this period geopolitically informed energy security narratives managed to 
establish a widespread perception that an energy crisis existed, using evocative language to focus 
public and political attention. This narrative had both repoliticised energy as well as generated a 
high degree of political response outside of energy governance institutions. Given the limited 
changes to the PEPP, however, it cannot be claimed that this narrative had, on its own, resulted 
in a policy paradigm change. 
 
Accumulation of Changes: 2008-2011 
This section observes that climate narratives, given the ongoing repoliticisation of energy, 
managed to provide the evidence of failure of existing policy missing in geopolitical security 
narratives. A newly emerging energy-security-climate narrative, combining elements of 
geopolitical and climate narratives, became effective in providing impetus for a policy paradigm 
change in a way that neither of the two narratives had managed on their own. 
By the late 2000s, results in terms of reducing carbon dioxide emissions were 
deteriorating, particularly as the ‘easy gains’ from the switch in electricity production from coal 
to gas in the 1990s were past (Carbon Trust 2006; Greenpeace 2006). Climate analysts and 
advocacy groups were providing empirical evidence that energy policy was not delivering on 
carbon dioxide reductions and renewable energy technology deployment (World Wildlife Fund 
2006; House of Commons 2007b). These results were problematic given overt claims made in 
the early 2000s, in response to climate challenges to the PEPP, that markets would deliver. 
Several high profile reports from credible institutions started to suggest that the UK Government 
should play a more active role in developing and deploying low carbon technologies (Stern 2006; 
IEA 2007). Academics also increasingly argued for more Government leadership and investment 
in research, development, demonstration and deployment of new energy technologies (e.g. 
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Foxon et al. 2005; Sauter and Watson 2007). Importantly, pressure increased after the adoption 
of the EU 20-20-20 targets in 2009 (Directive 2009/28/EC) which meant that the UK was now 
committed to sourcing 15% of all energy from renewables by 2020. 
Climate groups, think tanks, and some academics started to actively utilise fears about 
dependency on ‘unstable’ foreign suppliers and renewed interest in boosting energy 
independence and argued that the UK needed to focus on increasing its domestic energy 
production (Interview 18; Giddens 2009; Bird 2007). One example is a report for Greenpeace 
entitled ‘Oil and Peace Don’t Mix’ which overtly used geopolitical ideas about unstable 
suppliers, conflict and the need to increase independence to argue for greater state commitment 
to renewable energy (Greenpeace 2006). The argument here is that some climate groups 
strategically changed their narrative because they understood aspects of the geopolitical narrative 
to be capable of evoking political reaction (Interview 18). 
Given mounting evidence of policy failure, claims repeatedly made by the DTI and 
Ofgem that markets and competition would deliver on renewable energy and energy efficiency 
were looking increasingly less credible. Tendencies to rely on market instruments could be more 
credibly identified as part of the problem (Scrase et al 2009: 6). As such the PEPP became 
increasingly vulnerable to challenge and political contestation. Actors brought together climate 
change and geopolitical narratives to argue that a nationally relevant crisis does exist, that UK 
policy needs to change, and provided potential solutions in terms of a more active role for the 
state. 
By the late 2000s Government was starting to more actively look for ways to address 
these mounting pressures. The Climate Change Act of 2008 was one of the first outcomes of this 
re-think of energy policy (HM Government 2008a). This Act was held up as being the first of its 
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kind in the world in that it set legally binding carbon dioxide reduction targets up until 2050 of at 
least 80% (Watson 2009: 34). It was understood that “…(t)urning to renewables will help the UK 
recover some of its energy self-sufficiency” (DECC 2009b: 10), and as such domestically 
produced renewables became an answer to both climate change and energy security objectives. 
This marked a clear departure from PEPP goals. 
The UK Government had also started to make some substantial changes to its governance 
institutions, not least the establishment of the Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) in 2008. The setup of DECC reflects the understanding “…that climate change and 
energy policies are inextricably linked…” (DECC 2011a). This change is also significant in that 
it both promoted energy back up to Cabinet Level as well as mandating DECC to achieve 
specific climate and energy goals. Whilst Ofgem’s duty to contribute to the achievement of 
sustainable development had already been introduced in 2004, the 2008 Energy Act promoted 
this duty placing it on an equal footing with other objectives (HM Government 2008b). A new 
‘Office for Renewable Energy Deployment’ (ORED) was established within DECC to ensure 
that the UK would deliver on its new renewable targets (DECC 2009b: 9). The independent 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was also established to advise on and monitor progress 
towards achieving a lower carbon economy (House of Commons 2007b: 3).  
The challenge to the PEPP from the energy security-climate narrative also led to changes 
in the interpretive framework of policy makers. The 2009 report on the UK’s energy security 
regularly referenced the need for ‘home grown’, renewable energy in order to provide for both 
energy and climate security (Wicks 2009). This not only shows the energy security-climate 
narrative’s infiltration into government documents but it likewise emphasises the role that 
renewables were now to play. Another clear change in the interpretative framework was the 
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emerging stance on state-market roles in energy (cf. Miliband 2008; Wicks 2009). The new 
understanding of energy policy did not wholesale reject the previous paradigm in that it still 
recognised the many abilities of ‘the market’ to supply energy. But it did suggest a ‘strategic role 
for government’ in response to market failures and that a national policy was needed to provide 
incentives for the public good (Miliband 2008: 4). Malcolm Wicks’ report on energy security 
suggested that “…the era of heavy reliance on companies, competition and liberalisation must be 
re-assessed” (2009: 1). What also emerged at this stage was recognition of energy’s fundamental 
socio-economic role for society, as opposed to notions of energy as replaceable commodity 
popular under the PEPP (DECC 2009c). 
These changes manifested themselves in a number of policy documents and new policy 
instruments. There emerged over the course of a few years a considerable upsurge in policy 
documents, White Papers, and legislation (HM Government 2008a and 2008b; DECC 2009a and 
2009b; BIS and DECC 2009; DECC 2010).  Many of these documents, including ‘The UK Low 
Carbon Transition Plan’ and the ‘Renewable Energy Strategy’, overtly recognised the need for 
policy change (DECC 2009a and 2009b), albeit in the latter case, encouraged by Europe. The 
‘Renewable Energy Strategy’ “…put in place mechanisms to provide financial support for 
renewable electricity and heat worth around £30bn between now and 2020” (DECC 2009b: 8). 
DECC also announced their intention to directly fund four large scale carbon capture and storage 
demonstration plants, to channel about £3.2bn to help households become more energy efficient, 
to roll out smart meters in every home by the end of 2020 and to provide further state investment 
in offshore wind (DECC 2009a: 4). The RO was amended such that it was ‘banded’ (providing 
differing levels of support for different technologies) and could, therefore, no longer be 
understood as a technology-neutral instrument. Another significant change in terms of 
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instruments was the introduction of a ‘feed-in-tariff’ (FiT) in April 2010 aimed at incentivising 
small-scale renewable energy production (DECC 2009b: 8).   
On top of these new instruments, the Government also later embarked on a major 
revision of the energy market through the electricity market reform package. The draft Energy 
Bill of May 2012 includes suggestions for a number of mechanisms, including contracts for 
differences, capacity payments, emission performance standard, carbon floor price, to incentivise 
investment in low carbon electricity generation. Much of this new legislation represented a 
significant shift away from the previous reliance on market-based instruments for achieving 
energy policy objectives (Foxon 2012; Pearson and Watson 2012; DECC 2012).   
Given the accumulation of changes witnessed in this last period it can be observed, using 
the framework applied here, that each level of the PEPP had shifted from its position in 2000.  
These changes are summarised in Table 2 below and together suggest that a policy paradigm 
shift in UK energy policy can be identified. 
 
[Table 2: The Energy Policy Paradigm in 2000 and 2011 here] 
 
Discussion 
It is worth at this point briefly posing some questions with regard to the key insights gained from 
the application of this framework, as well as any gaps remaining. There are two principle points 
to be made here. Firstly, our observations about the influence of two different narratives within 
the process of change have allowed us to identify the new energy governance system not as one 
coherent, alternative energy policy paradigm but as based upon multiple perspectives on energy. 
These are evident in the new goals for energy policy, in some of the instruments now chosen and 
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in the new governance institutions established. Although the interpretive framework has altered 
to include climate change and geopolitical ideas, elements of belief in market ideas continue to 
persist alongside. Examples of the persistence of these ideas are the continued support for the EU 
ETS scheme to help drive emission reductions in the power sector and the central role for private 
actors in delivering UK energy supplies and services. Pro-market ideas about fiscal austerity and 
limited state intervention are also arguably influential over the Treasury’s recent attempts to limit 
further funding for renewable energy. By identifying that the new system has ‘picked and mixed’ 
between perspectives on energy and how energy should be governed, this paper has been able to 
explain why the current governance system is so complex and difficult to understand (Keay 
2012).   
The mixed nature of the new paradigm also means that assumptions are being made about 
the compatibility of policy goals, for example that energy security, affordability and climate 
objectives will be met using a mix of policy instruments. This assumption does not recognise, 
nor overtly address, the question of potential trade-offs between goals nor does it take account of 
the different perspectives to which they relate. The relative importance of different policy goals 
appears to be contested between the Coalition government partners and across different 
departments. For example, energy poverty objectives appear to be under pressure given decisions 
to pass most costs of low carbon energy on to consumers. The impact on affordability, a subject 
of growing political relevance, is likely to be considerable – already energy poverty numbers are 
escalating despite the objective of eradicating it by 2016 (DECC 2011b).  
The suggested framework has, therefore, proved useful for analysing whether or not a 
policy paradigm change has occurred and for revealing potential tensions within the current 
policy paradigm but there is one key limitation of the framework. While analytical emphasis has 
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been placed on the policy goals, instruments, interpretative frameworks and governance 
institutions, it has had less to say about whether or not institutional changes actually impact how 
current energy systems operate. This raises questions about whether the new paradigm will be 
able to deliver on the new goals or whether it will have to shift again in order to do so.   
 For example, while all of the changes observed here together amount to a policy paradigm 
change, it can also be argued that during the period of analysis relatively little changed in terms 
of the characteristics of the energy system. Government ambitions that 10% of electricity should 
be supplied by renewable sources by 2010 were missed, with only 6.5% of electricity produced 
from renewable sources in that year. Results elsewhere indicate that the UK is not on track to 
achieve the 15% renewable target for 2020. The principal actors providing electricity services 
have also changed little. For example, only 0.3% of electricity supply in 2010 was provided from 
suppliers other than the big six utilities, who continue to dominate electricity markets. This is of 
concern because recent, socio-technical analyses of energy transitions argue that system change, 
such as the one required to move to a secure and low carbon future, is often driven by new 
entrants and innovators rather than incumbent industry actors (Rotmans et al. 2001; Loorbach 
2007; Rotmans and Loorbach 2008). Arguably the continued ability of the big six utilities to 
influence policy based on their dominant market position and their key role in implementing 
government policy has important implications for achieving the goals of UK energy policy. As 
such, the framework applied in this paper has told us relatively little about the ways in which 
policy changes impact important outcomes on the ground. Without including wider impacts on 
the energy system in the analysis it is difficult to assess whether new policies are sufficient to 
meet objectives. 
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Conclusions 
Based on the analysis presented above it is evident that the PEPP has changed quite substantially 
on every level outlined in our theoretical framework. This is clearly a significant finding in itself, 
but it is in terms of understanding how and why change has taken place that the subtleties of the 
process come to light. By considering the role of narratives in the three eras of change we have 
been able to understand more about change and about the new paradigm. Although in the 2000 to 
2003 period climate change narratives offered a range of direct challenges to the PEPP, these 
were successfully compromised away with claims that the existing paradigm could deliver a low 
carbon future. Events took a different turn in the mid-2000s when geopolitically informed 
arguments about security of supply problems, partly in response to Russian resource nationalism, 
highlighted energy as an area in crisis. This served to open up energy policy to a crisis debate 
across public, media, academic and political circles  but by emphasising the fault of others 
provided less of a challenge to policies in place. Within the context of the crisis debate, however, 
evidence of policy failure not just to deliver on energy security but also on climate objectives 
gained prominence. As such, two initially separate narratives together performed central 
functions within the process of change despite the fact that one did not defeat the other to 
become the dominant narrative. In fact, it is in combination that they appeared most powerful to 
influence change.  
 This finding runs contrary to assumptions within sociological institutionalism whereby one 
narrative comes to dominate interpretations of crisis and then eventually replaces the incumbent 
policy paradigm. The identification of more than one narrative as influential in change provides 
explanatory detail not only of a messier and more contingent process of change (cf. Oliver and 
Pemberton 2004) but also about the structure of the new paradigm. Given that geopolitical and 
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climate ideas have both underpinned the process of change and that some market ideas and 
structures persist, the new paradigm is highly complex and also contains a variety of internal 
tensions. 
 The paper also identified a key shortcoming of the analytical framework. Whilst being 
adept at explaining policy paradigm change, it sheds little light on whether or not changes have 
achieved much ‘on the ground’. In terms of taking this analysis forward we propose that one way 
of remedying this situation would be to extend the analytical framework to include a fifth level 
which would include impacts of these changes on actors and their behaviour. The emerging 
literature on socio-technical transitions might serve as a useful complement to this analysis of 
policy paradigm change. This literature identifies policy and institutions as important within 
wider systemic change processes (Kern 2011; 2012) but pays more attention to the 
characteristics of the socio-technical system itself: the actors involved, the technologies they use, 
the user demands, and the physical infrastructures (Geels 2002). In combining insights from 
socio-technical literatures we would seek to maintain the in-depth insights into political 
complexities gleaned from institutional analysis whilst also including other characteristics of the 
socio-technical system within processes of transitions.  
In summary, the paper makes three contributions to theory in the ‘new’ institutionalism 
literature: First, it developed a framework for both measuring and explaining paradigm change 
building on historical, sociological and constructivist variants of new institutionalism. Second, it 
challenged the assumption with sociological institutionalism that one narrative comes to 
dominate interpretations of crisis and eventually replaces the incumbent paradigm. Third, it 
points to limitations of the paradigm framework in terms of neglecting ‘changes on the ground’ 
and suggests that the literature on socio-technical transitions might help to address this issue. 
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Table 1: The Pro-Market Energy Policy Paradigm in 2000 
 
 
Level  Description 
Interpretive 
framework 
- energy as tradable commodity 
- markets as most efficient vehicle for energy trade and supply 
- government should not supply energy, nor decide energy mix 
- energy to be traded and supplied in an economically efficient 
manner through competitive, freely trading markets 
- free markets understood as delivering energy security 
Objectives of Policy 
- the provision of secure, diverse and sustainable supplies of energy 
at competitive prices as an outcome of freely trading, competitive 
markets 
Instruments 
- regulatory framework designed to enhance ability of markets to 
supply energy at lowest cost 
- electricity pricing according to RPI-X formula 
- renewables obligation being developed to support renewable 
energy 
Governance 
Institutions 
- Department of Energy had been disbanded in 1992 
- responsibility for policy at subdivision of Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) 
- Ofgem key player: regulator to oversee markets to ensure low 
prices for consumers 
 
Tables
Table 2: The Energy Policy Paradigm in 2000 and 2011 
 
 
Level  
2000 2011 
Interpretive 
framework 
- energy as tradable commodity 
- markets as most efficient vehicle for 
energy trade and supply 
- government should not supply energy, 
nor decide energy mix 
- energy to be traded and supplied in an 
economically efficient manner through 
competitive, freely trading markets 
- free markets understood as delivering 
energy security 
- energy is understood to have a central 
socio-economic role to play rather than 
understood as a normal commodity 
- markets to supply energy but within 
tighter government specifications  
- market failure in climate and energy 
requires a relative change in the role of the 
state 
- more energy should be ‘home grown’ 
and should come from clean sources 
 
Objectives 
of Policy 
- the provision of secure, diverse and 
sustainable supplies of energy at 
competitive prices as an outcome of freely 
trading, competitive markets 
- energy security, including affordability, 
one of two primary objectives 
- climate change mitigation goals now 
legally binding through Climate Change 
Act (and specific to include precise level 
of emissions reductions) 
- increasing share of renewable energy 
now formal objective of policy 
- Affordability objectives somewhat 
sidelined 
Instruments 
- Regulatory framework designed to 
enhance ability of markets to supply 
energy at lowest cost 
- electricity pricing according to RPI-X 
formula 
- renewables obligation being developed to 
support renewable energy 
- variety of instruments put in place to 
facilitate more domestic energy production 
- FIT introduced for small-scale generation 
of renewable electricity 
- introduction and banding of renewables 
obligation 
- electricity market reform 
 
Governance 
Institutions 
- Department of Energy had been 
disbanded in 1992 
- responsibility for energy policy at 
subdivision of Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) 
- Ofgem key player: regulator to oversee 
markets to ensure low prices for 
consumers 
- Creation of DECC with specific energy 
security and climate mandates 
 - Other new institutions including the 
CCC and the Office for Renewable Energy 
Deployment 
- New energy and climate division within 
the FCO 
- Ofgem mandate changed to include 
sustainability 
 
